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Abstract 
 
Several factors affect attitudes toward ambiguity.  What happens, however, when people 
are asked to exchange an ambiguous alternative in their possession for an unambiguous 
one? We present three experiments in which individuals preferred to retain the former. 
This  status  quo  bias  emerged  both  within-  and  between-subjects,  with  and  without 
incentives, with different outcome distributions, and with endowments determined by 
both the experimenter and the participants themselves. Findings emphasize the need to 
account for the frames of reference under which evaluations of probabilistic information 
take place as well as modifications that should be incorporated into descriptive models 
of decision making.       
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  The phenomenon of ambiguity aversion – or the preference for gambles with 
known  as  opposed  to  unknown  probabilities  –  has  been  well  documented  in  the 
literature on decision making in both psychology and economics (see, e.g., Ellsberg, 
1961; Camerer & Weber, 1992; Keren & Gerritsen, 1999). Indeed, that the notion of 
ambiguity aversion is now well accepted in economics can be demonstrated by its use to 
explain, for example, certain phenomena in financial markets (Mukerji & Tallon, 2001).  
  At the same time, however, situations have been identified where people might 
prefer ambiguous alternatives.  Ellsberg (cited in Becker & Brownson, 1964), suggested 
that people may prefer ambiguous alternatives when known probabilities are small (cf., 
Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986, who also consider effects of losses and larger probabilities).  
In  addition,  Heath  and  Tversky  (1991)  demonstrated  a  so-called  competence  effect 
whereby people prefer ambiguous alternatives when they feel especially competent or 
knowledgeable about the source of uncertainty (see also Fox & Tversky, 1995). 
In  experiments  on  ambiguity  people  are  typically  asked  to  choose  between 
alternatives characterized by different types of uncertainty.  Curiously, however, they 
are not asked to choose between something they already own and an alternative they 
could accept in exchange where both have uncertain outcomes.
1 And yet, this latter 
form  of choice  is  quite  common  in economic transactions.   Consider,  for  example, 
choices  between,  say,  holding  onto  bonds  (stocks)  or  exchanging  them  for  stocks 
(bonds).  Other  examples  could  include  the  exchange  between  something  you  have 
already purchased – such as a vacation package – for another alternative. 
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate the effects of ambiguity in 
these kinds of situations. But first we note that neither classic economic reasoning nor 
descriptive theories of ambiguity distinguish between the two types of decision, i.e., 
choice between alternatives versus exchanging alternatives. On the other hand, many   4 
descriptive findings suggest that people “overvalue” what they currently own and that 
this can affect their willingness to exchange goods.  This has been labeled the “status 
quo” bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). A related line of research refers to the 
“endowment  effect”  or  the  fact  that  willingness-to-pay  (WTP)  prices  for  goods  are 
typically much smaller than willingness-to-accept (WTA) prices if the goods are already 
in a person’s possession, i.e., are part of their endowment (Thaler, 1980; Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). These findings are, of course, consistent with loss aversion in 
prospect theory that depends on the reference point used to describe a person’s assets 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  However, one could also think of reference points in 
terms of levels of probability (Viscusi, Magat, & Huber, 1987). 
The specific question we ask centers on what happens when the forces that lead 
to ambiguity aversion are confronted by those of the endowment effect.  In other words, 
will a person who owns an alternative with ambiguous outcomes exchange it for an 
alternative where the probabilities are known?  Consider an example: When choosing 
between stocks and bonds, a person selects the bonds. However, had the person owned 
those same stocks, would he or she have exchanged them for the bonds? 
This  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  We  test  the  potential  conflict  between 
ambiguity aversion and the endowment effect in three experiments. In the first, we use 
an  Ellsberg-like  task  and  demonstrate  that  participants  endowed  with  ambiguous 
gambles are reluctant to exchange these for their non-ambiguous counterparts.  These 
results were achieved using a between-subjects experimental design and without proper 
financial incentives. In Experiment 2, therefore, our aim was to replicate these results 
using both a within-subjects experimental design and proper financial incentives. By 
using this design, we sought to provide participants with the opportunity to question 
their own behavior and, yet, we still observed ambiguity seeking consistent with the   5 
status quo bias.  Experiment 1 and 2 both used abstract stimuli involving gambles. Thus 
in Experiment 3, we replicated Experiment 2 using a meaningful stock market context 
instead of gambles and obtained the same pattern of results.  In all three experiments, 
we  also  attempted  to  manipulate  the  strength  of  the endowment effect  by  allowing 
participants  more  opportunities  in  the  choice  process.  Finally,  we  conclude  by 
discussing our results and their implications.   
 
1. Experiment 1 
A  large  body  of  research  supporting  ambiguity  avoidance  has  used  similar 
experimental procedures to those adopted by Ellsberg. Typically, in these experiments 
participants  are  presented  with  two  urns  containing  100  balls.  One  urn  (the 
unambiguous)  contains  50  black  and  50  red  balls,  while  the  other  (the  ambiguous) 
contains unknown quantities of black and red balls. Participants are asked to choose a 
color and then draw a ball from one of the urns. If they draw their chosen color they win 
an amount of money, otherwise they win nothing. These experiments have generally 
shown that for a range of real and hypothetical positive payoffs from $1 to $100 and 
when probabilities are not extreme (i.e., close to 0 or 1) individuals tend to be ambiguity 
averse. That is, they show a strong preference for the unambiguous urn regardless of 
whether they have to choose which urn to draw from or to state a price for the gamble 
(WTP or WTA).  However, research on ambiguity avoidance has not investigated the 
situations where individuals already own gambles and have the opportunity to exchange 
them, i.e., the effects of possible status quo bias. 
The  primary  objective  of  Experiment  1  was to  investigate  whether  such  a  bias 
affects preferences between ambiguous and unambiguous gambles in a typical Ellsberg 
situation.   6 
1.1. Hypotheses 
Our  main  prediction  was  that  the  status  quo  bias  would  reduce  the  level  of 
ambiguity aversion typically observed when participants are asked to choose to play 
gambles  from  either  an  ambiguous  or  unambiguous  urn.  This  led  to  two  specific 
hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1.1. – “Ellsberg”   
First, participants who are not initially endowed with a gamble will be ambiguity 
averse by choosing to play the unambiguous over the ambiguous gamble.  
 
Hypothesis 1.2. – “Status quo”  
Second, that the degree of ambiguity aversion will differ between participants who 
are and are not initially endowed with the ambiguous gamble. Specifically, the former 
will choose to play (by retaining) the ambiguous gamble to a greater extent than the 
latter choose the ambiguous option. 
 
We also sought to enhance the degree of endowment by increasing participants’ 
involvement in the choice process (cf., Koehler, Gibbs, & Hogarth, 1994). To achieve 
this,  some participants  initially endowed with  the ambiguous  gamble were asked to 
choose in advance the color of the ball before deciding whether to retain their gamble or 
exchange it for the unambiguous alternative. We reasoned that this manipulation would 
encourage  participants  to  imagine  actually  playing  the  gamble  thereby  increasing  a 
sense of ownership and, in so doing, enhance the status quo effect. This led to our third 
hypothesis: 
   7 
Hypothesis 1.3. – “Involvement”   
 The  proportion  of  participants  retaining  the  ambiguous  gamble  will  be  greater 
among those who choose the color of the ball prior to as opposed to after deciding to 
keep or reject the ambiguous gamble (Hypothesis 1.3). 
 
1.2. Design 
There  were three  conditions all based on Ellsberg’s original  experiment. All 
participants were presented with two urns and required to select a ball from one of the 
urns and to guess its color, red or black. They were asked to imagine that a correct guess 
was worth 10 pounds (sterling). These were hypothetical payoffs but participants were 
asked to answer as if they were playing with real money. Participants were presented 
with information about the numbers of red and black balls in each of the two urns. For 
one of the urns (Urn U) the information was unambiguous showing that it contained 100 
balls,  50  red  and  50  black.  For  the  other  (Urn  A)  the  information  was  ambiguous 
showing that it also contained 100 balls, but without any information indicating the 
numbers of each color. 
In  the  first  condition  (Control),  a  replication  of  the  Ellsberg  procedure, 
participants had to choose whether to gamble using Urn A or Urn U. In the second 
condition (Status Quo 1) participants were given a ticket to play gamble A based on Urn 
A. They were then presented with a new gamble U, based on Urn U, and asked whether 
they wanted to keep their ticket for gamble A or to exchange it for the right to play 
gamble U.  The third condition (Status Quo 2) was the same as Status Quo 1 in all 
respects except that participants chose which color they wanted before being given the 
opportunity to keep or exchange the ticket. Since the primary concern of this and the 
other experiments in this article was to investigate whether the status quo bias affects   8 
ambiguity  aversion,  the  ambiguous  gamble  was  always  presented  first  and  the 
unambiguous second when gambles were presented successively.  
 
1.3. Procedure  
There were three experimental sessions, one for each of the conditions described 
above. Participants received general instructions about how to complete the task and 
were shown the two urns. All task relevant information was typed on separate sheets. 
For the first condition, the gamble information was presented on a single sheet. For the 
second and third conditions participants were initially presented with the description of 
Gamble A and a ticket that contained a statement indicating the right to play the gamble. 
Then they were presented with a new piece of paper describing Gamble U and they had 
to tick a box to indicate whether they wished to retain Gamble A or exchange it for 
Gamble U. In the third condition, participants had to choose which color they would 
gamble on before receiving information about Gamble U.  Finally, one ball was selected 




180  participants  were  recruited  from  the  undergraduate  population  of  Leeds 
University Business School (105 female, 75 male). The average age of participants was 
20 years. They attended one of three sessions dedicated to the Control (N=72), Status 
Quo 1 (N= 41) or Status Quo 2 (N= 67) conditions respectively.   9 
 
1.5. Results 
The number of participants choosing to play Gamble A and Gamble U under the 
three conditions is presented in Table 1. The first row of data in this table shows that 
under control conditions most participants preferred Gamble U over Gamble A (Z = 
1.89,  p  <  0.05).  These  findings  are  consistent  with  the  Ellsberg  hypothesis  (1.1) 
predicting ambiguity aversion.  
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
The second and third rows of data in this table present data that are consistent 
with  Hypothesis  1.2  predicting  a  status  quo  bias.  In  particular,  significantly  more 
participants retained Gamble A in the Status Quo Groups than those who chose Gamble 
A in the Control Group. This was supported by two-sample proportions tests (Z = -2.05, 
p < 0.05 Status quo 1 setting; Z = -4.57, p < 0.001 Status quo 2 setting). 
Finally,  the  data  are  also  consistent  with  Hypothesis  1.3  (Involvement)  that 
predicted a stronger status quo bias when participants are asked which color ball they 
would choose before deciding whether to keep or exchange Gamble A  for Gamble U. 
The proportion of individuals deciding to keep their ticket for Gamble A in Status Quo 
Group 2, who chose before deciding, was significantly greater than that in Status Quo 
Group 1 who did not choose before deciding (Z = 1.72, p < 0.05). 
 
1.6. Discussion 
Support for Hypothesis 1.1 (Ellsberg) is consistent with a large body of previous 
research showing ambiguity avoidance (e.g. Ellsberg, 1961; Raiffa, 1961; Becker & 
Brownson, 1964; Yates & Zukowsi, 1976; Cohen, Jaffray, & Said, 1985; Eisenberger &   10 
Weber, 1995). The support for Hypothesis 1.2 (Status quo) is important in that, to our 
knowledge, it is the first time that being endowed with an ambiguous gamble has been 
shown to reduce ambiguity avoidance. We had predicted that this manipulation would 
enhance the degree of endowment and thereby support the role of the status quo in 
moderating ambiguity avoidance. Indeed, this latter finding suggests that the existence 
of conditions under which ambiguity avoidance may be replaced by ambiguity seeking 
and that individuals may demand compensation to switch from an ambiguous to an 
unambiguous gamble. 
Support for our prediction of decreased ambiguity avoidance when participants 
were asked, in advance, which color ball they would choose (Involvement) raises issues 
concerning  the  mechanisms  underlying  this  effect.  In  investigating  why  people  are 
reluctant  to exchange lottery  tickets, Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996)  argued  that regret 
associated with the possibility of experiencing foregone gains was a major factor. We 
believe  that  regret  may  also  play  a  role  in  our  findings.  When  participants  in  our 
experiment chose a color in advance, they were exposing themselves to more regret than 
would be implied by simply keeping or rejecting the ambiguous gamble.  
Three  features  of  Experiment  1  demand  further  comment.  First,  participants 
were asked to imagine that correctly guessing the color of the ball drawn from the urn 
was worth £10. It is important to determine whether these effects would also occur with 
real  pay-offs  (Camerer  &  Hogarth,  1999).  Second,  Experiment  1  was  based  on  a 
between-subjects analysis of participants’ preferences for ambiguous and unambiguous 
gambles. A stronger test of the effects of the status quo bias on ambiguity aversion 
would involve a within-subjects analysis where participants’ preferences for equivalent 
ambiguous  and  unambiguous  gambles  are  compared  across  status  quo  and  control 
conditions. Third, in Experiment 1 we demonstrated that asking participants to choose   11 
the color of the ball prior to being offered the opportunity to exchange the gamble 
decreased  ambiguity  avoidance.  Before  attributing  this  to  the  status  quo  bias,  it  is 
important to investigate other factors known to increase the bias to see whether they 
also  affect  ambiguity  avoidance.  One  such  factor,  source  preference,  refers  to  the 
finding that the value associated with a good is higher when individuals pre-select it 
rather than when it is given to them (Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1994). The primary 
purpose of Experiment 2 is to investigate the impact of these three issues on the findings 
reported in Experiment 1. 
 
2. Experiment 2 
2.1. Hypotheses 
The  purpose  of  Experiment  2  was  to  analyze  status  quo  bias  effects  on 
ambiguity avoidance using between- and within-subjects analyses and with incentives. 
Similar to Experiment 1 participants were presented with ambiguous and unambiguous 
gambles  associated  with  drawing  a  ball  from  an  urn  filled  with  colored  balls. 
Participants had to choose between pairs of ambiguous and unambiguous gambles on 
two  occasions,  once  when  they  had  been  previously  endowed  with  the  ambiguous 
gambles  and  once  when  there  was  no  prior  endowment.  Since  separate  groups  of 
participants completed these activities in one of two orders, it is possible to compare the 
first responses of these two groups in order to undertake a between-subjects analysis of 
the status quo bias.  
 
Hypothesis 2.1. – “Status quo between subjects”   
On the basis of the results from Experiment 1, we predicted that the proportion 
of individuals preferring to retain the right to participate in an ambiguous gamble (when   12 
offered  to  exchange  it  for  its  unambiguous  counterpart)  will  be  greater  than  the 
proportion of individuals choosing the ambiguous alternative where there is no prior 
endowment. 
 
Hypothesis 2.2. – “Status quo within subjects”    
Since  participants  were  presented  with  equivalent  pairs  of  ambiguous  and 
unambiguous gambles under the Neutral and Endowment Conditions, there are four 
possible profiles of revealed preferences. Table 2 illustrates these four profiles across 
the  two  order  conditions.  Given  that  all  participants  completed  both  activities,  the 
tendency  to  choose  consistently  could  dilute  the  status  quo  bias.  Nevertheless,  we 
predicted that when inconsistency occurred, significantly more preference reversals will 
be consistent, as opposed to inconsistent, with the status quo bias, i.e., an asymmetry 
between responses in cells 3 and 4 of Table 2 with cell 3 being greater than cell 4. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
 
   In order to evaluate further whether factors known to increase the status quo bias 
also affect ambiguity avoidance, we induced the bias in two ways. Either participants 
were given three ambiguous gambles by the experimenter and then had an opportunity 
to exchange each one for its unambiguous counterparts or they were presented with the 
three ambiguous gambles, asked to choose one of them and then offered the opportunity 
to exchange the chosen gamble for its unambiguous counterpart.  Reasoning that the act 
of choice would increase a sense of endowment, we predicted: 
 
   13 
Hypothesis 2.3. – “Source preference”   
More participants will retain the ambiguous gamble if they chose it, than if it is 
given to them by the experimenter. 
 
2.2. Design 
Three  pairs  of  unambiguous-ambiguous  gambles  were  developed  from  those 
used by Smith, Dickhaut, and Pardo (2002) describing urns containing red, blue and 
yellow balls. The urn corresponding to the unambiguous gamble contained 90 balls, 30 
of each color. The urn corresponding to the ambiguous gamble contained 90 balls; 30 
were known to be red, each of the remaining balls was either yellow or blue, though the 
number of each was unknown. The three pairs of gambles were differentiated in terms 
of the pay-off structure associated with drawing the red, blue and yellow balls from an 
urn. The structure for each pair is described in Table 3. While these pay-offs were 
described in terms of points gained from drawing a particular ball, participants were told 
in advance that points would be converted into pounds at a fixed rate of 5 pounds 
sterling per 2000 points. All gambles had an expected value of 5 pounds sterling. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
---------------------------------------- 
There were three different schemes for presenting gambles. Under the neutral 
(N) scheme each pair of ambiguous/unambiguous gambles was presented to participants 
and they were asked to choose which gamble they preferred to play in each pair. Under 
the participant-determined status quo (PDSQ) scheme, participants were presented with 
the three ambiguous gambles, chose which they preferred to play and then took a ticket 
for the right to play this gamble. Next, they were given an opportunity to either keep the 
ticket or exchange it for a ticket to play its unambiguous counterpart (i.e., the one with   14 
the same outcome structure). Under the experimenter determined status-quo (EDSQ) 
scheme, the experimenter gave each participant three tickets for the right to play each of 
the  ambiguous  gambles.  Next,  participants  were  given  opportunities  to  keep  or 
exchange each of these tickets for another to play its unambiguous counterpart. In order 
to undertake both within- and between-subjects’ data analysis and to control for order 
effects, three different groups of participants were formed, with each completing two of 
the three gambling schemes across two phases of the experiment.  Table 4 outlines 
which schemes each group completed and the order in which they completed them for 
the first and second experimental phases. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
--------------------------------- 
2.3. Procedure 
Participants were given a set of general instructions and a pack containing the 
decision problems, one per sheet. There were problem-specific instructions on the top of 
each sheet. Participants were told to work through the problems in order, writing their 
responses in the spaces provided and then putting the sheets into a folder. They were not 
allowed to change their responses once they had placed them in the folder. The decision 
sheets for each of the conditions are included in the Appendix. 
For the PDSQ and EDSQ conditions, tickets indicating the right-to-play each 
gamble  described  on  that  sheet  were  attached  (a  separate  ticket  for  each  gamble 
described). Whenever they decided not to play a gamble, participants were instructed to 
place the corresponding ticket into the folder. Otherwise they left the ticket on the desk 
in front of them. 
The experiment was conducted in three different sessions, one for each of the 
groups described above. All participants were told at the outset that they would each   15 
receive 5 pounds sterling for participating and that 10 of them, picked at random, would 
be paid an extra amount to be determined at the end of the session by resolving the 
outcomes of the gambles they had chosen. 
 
2.4. Participants 
A total of 78 students at Leeds University Business School (45 female, 33 male) 
were  recruited  from  undergraduate  and  master  courses.  The  average  age  of  the 
participants was 23 years. 
 
2.5. Results 
To test Hypothesis 2.1 (Status quo between subjects) we undertook a between-
subjects analysis by comparing the three groups in terms of their choice behavior on the 
task they undertook in the first phase of the experiment.  In particular, we determined 
the percentage of times participants expressed a preference to play ambiguous gambles 
in (1) the PDSQ condition, where there was just one decision to be made between their 
preferred ambiguous gamble and its counterpart, (2) the EDSQ, where there were three 
decisions between each pair of their endowed ambiguous gamble and its unambiguous 
counterpart, and (3) the N condition, where there were also these three decisions but 
without any prior endowment. These data are presented in Table 5 for participants run 
under each of the three outcome structures.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
---------------------------------- 
The fourth column of Table 5 outlines the percentage of participants choosing 
the ambiguous gamble for each group, collapsed across the three pay-off structures. 
Analysis  of  these  collapsed  data  supported  Hypothesis  2.1  (Status  quo  between 
subjects), predicting an endowment effect, by showing a stronger preference for the   16 
ambiguous gamble under PDSQ and EDSQ as compared with the N schemes (t = -2.37, 
p<0.01). Furthermore, the percentage of participants choosing to play the ambiguous 
gamble was significantly greater under the PDSQ as compared with the N scheme (t = -
2.67, p < 0.005). Within pay-off structures, this difference was statistically significant 
for Structure 2, which was preferred by most (n=20) participants (Z = -2.78, p <0.005). 
This was not, however, the case under pay-off structures 1 and 3, but here sample sizes 
for  PDSQ  were  small  –  2  and  8,  respectively  (all  differences  in  proportions  were, 
however,  in  the  expected  direction).  A  similar  analysis  comparing  EDSQ  and  N 
gambles failed to find a significant difference for both the aggregate data (t = -0.79, p 
>0.10) and within schemes although all differences were, once again, in the predicted 
direction.  
To summarize, the data support Hypothesis 2.1 (Status quo between subjects) in 
the presence of a strong endowment manipulation.  It is also worth noting that the level 
of ambiguity avoidance was relatively low in the N condition (we return to this in the 
discussion). 
Hypothesis  2.2  (Status  quo  within  subjects),  predicting  inconsistencies  in 
revealed preferences across the two phases will be largely in the direction predicted by 
the status quo bias, involved comparing the percentage of each type of inconsistency for 
each group. These data are presented in Table 6 in terms of the overall percentage of 
inconsistent  responses  across  the  two  experimental  phases  (column  three)  and  the 
percentage of these responses that were and were not in the direction predicted by the 
status  quo  bias  (columns  one  and  two).  For  all  three  groups,  a  significantly  higher 
percentage of the inconsistencies were found to lie in the direction predicted by the 
status quo bias (for all three binomial proportion tests p <0.005)
2. That is, participants 
retained  an  ambiguous  gamble  when  endowed  with  it,  but  chose  its  unambiguous   17 
counterpart under neutral conditions. It is, however, important to note that the majority 
of decisions were taken consistently across the two phases of the experiment. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
-------------------------------------- 
To test Hypothesis 2.3 (Source preference), we undertook a between-subjects 
analysis to determine whether participants were more likely to retain the ambiguous 
gamble  when  they  chose  it,  relative  to  when  it  had  been  given  to  them  by  the 
experimenter.  In  particular,  we  compared  the  percentage  of  decisions  to  retain  the 
ambiguous gamble in the first phase of the task across the PDSQ and EDSQ conditions. 
These data, presented in the second and third rows of Table 5, indicate that the status 
quo bias was stronger when participants initially choose a gamble rather than when it is 
given to them. However, while the ambiguous gamble was retained more often in the 
PDSQ than in the EDSQ condition, this effect was only marginally significant (t=1.49, 
p = 0.073).  
 
2.6. Discussion 
The findings of Experiment 2 were consistent with the between-subjects status 
quo bias hypothesis (Hypothesis 2.1) and replicated Experiment 1 by showing that the 
proportion  of  ambiguity  seeking  choices  was  greater  for  participants  who  had  been 
endowed – as  opposed to not been endowed – with  ambiguous gambles. However, this 
effect was not statistically significant for the EDSQ condition involving a weaker status 
quo manipulation.  The findings were also in line with the within-subjects status quo 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 2.2) in that observed preference reversals under the EDSQ and 
PDSQ conditions were predominantly consistent with a status quo bias. Specifically, 
when  participants  were  inconsistent  in  choosing  between  the  ambiguous  and   18 
unambiguous gambles across the two phases of the task, the observed inconsistency was 
consistent with the participants keeping the ambiguous gamble when they had been 
endowed with it.   
The  findings  only  marginally  confirmed  the  source  preference  hypothesis 
(Hypothesis  2.3)  predicting  that  there  would  be  a  stronger  status  quo  effect  when 
participants were allowed to choose an ambiguous gamble rather than when this was 
given to them by the experimenter. Further confirmation of these effects would suggest 
that revealed ambiguity attitudes are also affected by the source of the endowment. 
While the findings of Experiment 2 provide further support that the status quo 
can affect attitudes to ambiguity, several authors have emphasized the need to test the 
applicability  of  experimental  results  based  on  gambling  devices  to  more  realistic 
settings  (for  a  review  see  Camerer,  1995).  Experiment  3  was  designed  to  replicate 
Experiment 2 in a financial context, using exactly the same gambles but describing 
them as investment alternatives. 
 
3. Experiment 3 
The primary purpose of Experiment 3 was to test the three hypotheses examined 
in Experiment 2 in a financial context. Since previous research has shown that the status 
quo bias (e.g. Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) and ambiguity aversion (reviewed in, 
e.g., Camerer & Weber, 1992) occur across a broad range of experimental and everyday 
contexts, we predicted support for all three hypotheses. 
 
3.1. Design 
The same three pairs of unambiguous – ambiguous gambles used in Experiment 
2  were  described  in  Experiment  3  as  investment  products.  Each  product  offered   19 
different rewards to participants depending upon the daily performance of a stock that 
was to be simulated at the end of the experiment. The price of the stock could go up, 
down or remain the same and this determined the rewards, in points, that participants 
would receive. For example rather than being told that “If you draw a red ball you win 
3000 points” as per Table 3, participants in Experiment 3 were told “If Stock A remains 
the same you will earn 3000 points.”  
The unambiguous products included information about the recent performance 
of the stock. Participants were told that over the last 90 days, the stock had gone up on 
30 occasions, down on 30 occasions and remained the same on 30 occasions.  For the 
ambiguous products, the information indicated that over the last 90 days, the stock had 
remained the same on 30 occasions but there was no information on the frequency with 
which the price went up or down for the remaining 60 days. Similar to Experiment 2, 
there were three different groups of participants as described in Table 4. 
 
3.2. Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 2. Participants worked through the 
pack containing the decision problems and received 5 pounds sterling for participating. 
At the end of each session 10 participants were selected to play one of their chosen 
investments and they also received the amount generated by playing out this investment. 
The experiment was conducted in 3 different sessions, corresponding to the 3 groups N, 
EDSQ and PDSQ.  
 
3.3. Participants 
A total of 86 students at Leeds University Business School (47 female, 39 male) 
were  recruited  from  undergraduate  and  master  courses.  The  average  age  of  the   20 
participants was 22 years. The characteristics of these groups are comparable to the 
students participating in Experiment 2. 
 
3.4. Results 
We tested the three hypotheses in the same way as described in Experiment 2. 
Hypothesis 2.1 (Status quo between subjects) was evaluated by undertaking a between-
subjects analysis comparing groups in terms of their choice behavior in the first phase 
of  the  experiment.   Table  7  shows  the  percentages  of times  participants  revealed  a 
preference for the ambiguous investment over its unambiguous counterpart for each of 
the three pay-off structures and summed across all three.   
-------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------------- 
These data showed that participants preferred the ambiguous investment more 
frequently under PDSQ and EDSQ conditions than under the N condition (t = -2.24, p < 
0.05). Hypothesis 2.1 (Status quo between subjects) was also confirmed by comparing 
these percentages for the PDSQ and N condition (t = -2.26, p < 0.05).  The difference 
between N and EDSQ was in the direction predicted but not statistically significant (t = 
-1.09, p = 0.14). 
To test Hypothesis 2.2 (Status quo within subjects), we followed the procedure 
used  in  Experiment  2  that  involved  calculating  the  number  of  inconsistencies  in 
preference across the two phases of the experiment, comparing the percentage of these 
in the direction predicted by status quo effects with those in the opposite direction. 
These data are presented in Table 8 for each of the three groups separately along with 
information  indicating  the  overall  percentage  of  all  stated  preferences  that  were 
inconsistent  across  the  two  experimental  phases.  While  most  decisions  were  taken   21 
consistently across the two phases of the experiment, for all three groups, a significantly 
higher percentage of the inconsistencies were in the direction predicted by the status 
quo bias (for all three binomial proportion tests p<0.01)
3. Thus, the predominant type of 
inconsistency involved participants retaining an ambiguous gamble when endowed with 
it, but choosing its unambiguous counterpart under neutral conditions. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Hypothesis  2.3  (Source  preference)  predicted  a  stronger  status  quo  bias  in 
participants that chose the investment in their endowment, prior to deciding whether to 
exchange  it  or  not,  than  in  participants  who  were  given  the  investment  by  the 
experimenter.  While  the  data  presented  in  Table  7  suggest  that  the  percentage  of 
decisions to keep the ambiguous investment in the PDSQ condition of group 2 was 
higher than in the EDSQ condition of group 3, this effect was not statistically significant 
(t = 0.94,  p = 0.176).  
 
3.5. Discussion 
Similar to the two previous experiments, Experiment 3 demonstrated a status 
quo  effect.  Endowing  participants  with  an  ambiguous  alternative  increased  the 
likelihood  that  they  would  retain  it  when  offered  an  exchange  for  its unambiguous 
counterpart.   This effect occurred when comparisons were made both within and across 
individuals. Importantly, Experiment 3 showed that this effect extends beyond a simple 
gambling  situation  to  one  where  participants  are  choosing  between  hypothetical 
investments.    There  was,  however,  no  support  for  the  source  preference  hypothesis 
(Hypothesis 3.3) predicting a stronger status quo effect when participants were allowed 
to choose an ambiguous gamble rather than being given it by the experimenter. While   22 
the difference between the EDSQ and PDSQ was in the predicted direction, it was not 
statistically significant. These findings, along with those reported from the other two 
experiments, are discussed in greater length in the next section.  
 
General discussion 
Our three experiments have outlined a previously unrecognized condition where 
people  do  not  avoid  ambiguity  systematically.  We  have  shown  that  endowing 
individuals  with  an  ambiguous  alternative  can  significantly  decrease  ambiguity 
avoidance.  In  all  three  experiments,  there  was  evidence  suggesting  that  participants 
were more likely to retain an ambiguous alternative over its unambiguous counterpart 
when they had previously been endowed with it, in comparison to a neutral situation 
without prior endowment. This effect occurred both within- and between-subjects, with 
hypothetical  and  real  incentives,  and  in  experimental  situations  involving  choices 
between both gambles and investments.  
An important feature of Experiments 2 and 3 was evidence showing that the 
effect of the status quo on ambiguity aversion was less in within-subjects as compared 
with between-subject analyses. These findings are broadly similar to those reported by 
LeBoeuf and Shafir (2003) in their studies of risky choice framing where a within-
subject analysis comparing participants’ first and second responses showed a reduced 
framing  effect.  In  explaining  their  findings  LeBoeuf  and  Shafir  (2003)  argued  that 
normative principles such as consistency and dominance drive decision making when 
their appropriateness is recognized and, in doing so, may override other factors, such as 
framing, in determining choice behavior (see also Fiedler, 1988; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1986). In our Experiments 2 and 3, choice problems were presented sufficiently close 
together that it is highly likely that they were recognized on the second occasion and   23 
that consistency provided the basis for choice. As well as raising important issues about 
the appropriateness of within-subjects studies for investigating human decision making, 
this explanation of our findings also implies that consistency across situations may be 
another factor that affects ambiguity aversion.      
    Different  suggestions  have  been  made  to  explain  departures  from  ambiguity 
avoidance. Some authors, for example, have shown that ambiguity avoidance varies 
with the range of outcomes and expected probabilities (Kahn & Sarin, 1988; Einhorn & 
Hogarth, 1986). However, given that we have shown different attitudes to ambiguity 
between pairs of gambles identical in terms of probabilities and outcomes, this cannot 
explain  our  findings.  Nonetheless,  the  dependence  of  ambiguity  avoidance  on  the 
probability and outcome domains can help explain the relatively low rates of ambiguity 
aversion in the N conditions of Experiments 2 and 3 compared to that of Experiment 1.  
Other factors also known to affect attitudes towards ambiguity cannot explain 
our  findings.    Consider,  for  example,  the  competence  hypothesis  whereby  people 
exhibit ambiguity seeking when knowledgeable about the source of uncertainty (Fox & 
Tversky, 1995; Heath & Tversky, 1991).  In Experiments 1 and 2, we used abstract 
gambling devices with no possibility of differential competence. In Experiment 3, while 
the content might have evoked feelings of competence, the context was the same for all 
conditions. Nor can our findings be explained by “other’s evaluation” (Curley, Yates, & 
Abrams, 1986) where individuals who know that their choices will be evaluated by 
others reveal greater ambiguity aversion. In all of the conditions of our experiments, 
participants were aware that they would be told publicly about the outcomes of all the 
alternatives. Similarly, we can not interpret our findings in terms of the “comparative 
ignorance” hypothesis (Fox & Tversky, 1995) whereby the rates of ambiguity aversion 
decrease when ambiguous and unambiguous options are evaluated in non-comparative   24 
settings (see also, Chow & Sarin, 2001, 2002; Fox & Weber, 2002). In our experiments, 
despite  the  fact  that  the  initial  status  quo  alternatives  were  described  in  a  non-
comparative fashion, decisions between ambiguous and unambiguous options allowed 
for direct comparison. 
There are, however, several psychological phenomena related to the status quo 
bias that seem to provide a more promising explanation of our findings For instance, the 
existence of some form of anticipated emotional reactions could have influenced the 
results of our  experiments. It  has been shown, that anticipation of  feelings is more 
poignant when they involve potential losses from the status quo (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982).  In the context of decisions regarding lottery tickets, the regret anticipated when 
giving up a potentially winning lottery ticket (for another lottery ticket) has been shown 
to be higher than the regret anticipated when retaining a ticket in the status quo and 
running the risk of not changing it for a winning ticket (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996). We 
suggest  that  this  could  also  occur  when  lottery  tickets  differ  in  their  degree  of 
uncertainty and that the manipulation in Experiment 1, where individuals chose a color 
for the winning ball, enhanced this anticipation further. Moreover, the source preference 
effect of the PDSQ conditions of Experiments 2 and 3 is possibly related to the illusion 
of control (Langer, 1975) and more weight being associated with choosing as opposed 
to being given alternatives (Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1994; Koehler et al., 1994).  
    The practical significance of our results can be illustrated in terms of our earlier 
example comparing the decision between investing in stocks or bonds with the decision 
to exchange stocks (bonds) in one’s possession with bonds (stocks). Results suggest that 
compared to a choice situation, a tendency to stick to stocks (bonds) will emerge when 
deciding on the exchange and this will be stronger when individuals have chosen the 
stocks in their endowment in advance.    25 
In addition, previous research has suggested that individuals are willing to pay a 
premium to avoid ambiguity. This includes experiments involving choice and judgment. 
Indeed,  in  their  extensive  review,  Camerer  and  Weber  (1992)  use  the  unique  term 
“ambiguity premium” to report the degree of ambiguity aversion implied by results of 
different types of experiments. Since our results show that attitudes towards ambiguity 
are significantly affected by the reference point from which alternatives are evaluated 
(having or not having an ambiguous gamble in the endowment), comparisons between 
results of experiments implying different frames are problematic. We therefore suggest 
caution  in  the  use  of  the  concept  of  “ambiguity  premium”  and  question  whether 
previous experiments have captured what individuals are truly willing to pay to avoid 
ambiguity.  
The endowment effects reported here suggest the need to modify descriptive 
models  of  decision  making  under  uncertainty.  Several  models  do  consider  the 
distinction between different degrees of uncertainty while allowing for the existence of 
endowment effects in ambiguous settings (e.g., Cumulative Prospect Theory, Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1992). However, they do not account for exchanges between ambiguous and 
risky alternatives.  
  Finally, the experiments in the present paper can be extended in several ways. In 
all  three  experiments  reported  in  this  paper  participants  were  asked  to  express  a 
preference between equivalent ambiguous and unambiguous gambles. They were not, 
however,  allowed  to  express  indifference.  Future  research  is  needed  to  determine 
whether the opportunity to express indifference affects the impact of the status quo bias 
on attitudes to ambiguity. In addition, while we have considered the effects of the status 
quo bias when individuals are endowed with ambiguous prospects, further experiments 
might look at other frames of reference and response modes and in turn investigate their   26 
effects across a broader range of probabilities and outcomes. Of particular interest could 
be  to  explore  the  amounts  individuals  are  willing  to  pay  or  require  to  exchange 
alternatives subject to different degrees of uncertainty in the line of studies that have 
looked at the values associated with increases and reductions in risk (cf. Viscusi, Magat, 
and Huber, 1987).  
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Notes 
1. Some experiments have considered selling and buying prices for ambiguous and non-
ambiguous assets. However, here one of the alternatives being exchanged (i.e., cash) 
has no uncertainty associated with it (Sarin & Weber, 1993; Eisenberger & Weber, 
1995). 
2. In fact, the binomial test for group 3 is inappropriate because there are 3 observations 
for each participant. However, of the 16 participants, 7 provided a total of 8 inconsistent 
judgments. Only 1 of these 8 was inconsistent with the status quo bias. 
3. Again, the binomial test for group 3 implies 3 decisions per participant. However,   of 
the 17 participants in group 3, 7 provided a total of 9 inconsistent judgments of which 
only 2 were inconsistent with the status quo bias (i.e., similar to Experiment 2). 
   28 
References 
 
Bar-Hillel, Maya and Efrat Neter (1996), “Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange  
  Lottery Tickets?”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 17-27. 
Becker, Selwin W. and Fred O. Brownson (1964), “What Price Ambiguity? Or the Role  
  of Ambiguity in Decision-Making”, Journal of Political Economy, 72, 62-73. 
Camerer, Colin F. (1995), Individual Decision Making. In: Kagel J.K. and Roth A.E. 
(eds.)  The  Handbook  of  Experimental  Economics,  Princeton,  Princeton 
University Press, 587-703. 
Camerer, Colin F. and Robin M. Hogarth (1999), “The Effects of Financial Incentives  
in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework”, Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty, 19, 7-42. 
Camerer, Colin F. and Martin Weber (1992), “Recent Developments in Modeling  
Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 
325-370. 
Chow, Clare C. and Rakesh K. Sarin (2001), “Comparative Ignorance and the Ellsberg 
  Paradox”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 22, 129-139. 
Chow, Clare C. and  Rakesh K. Sarin. (2002), “Known, Unknown and Unknowable 
  Uncertainties”, Theory and Decision, 52, 127-138. 
Cohen, Michele, Jean-Yves Jaffray and Tanios Said (1985), “Individual Behavior under 
  Risk and under Uncertainty: An Experimental Experiment”, Theory and  
  Decision, 50, 360-394. 
Curley, Shawn P., Frank Yates and Richard A. Abrams (1986), "Psychological Sources  
of  Ambiguity  Avoidance",  Organizational  Behavior  and  Human  Decision 
Processes, 38, 230-256.   29 
Einhorn, Hillel J. and Robin M. Hogarth (1986), ”Decision Making under Ambiguity”,  
  Journal of Business, 59, 225-250. 
Eisenberger, Roselies and Martin Weber (1995), “Willingness-to-Pay and Willingness- 
To-Accept  for  Risky  and  Ambiguous  Lotteries”,  Journal  of  Risk  and 
Uncertainty, 10, 223-233. 
Ellsberg, Daniel (1961), “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms”, The Quarterly 
 Journal of Economics, 75, 643-669. 
Fiedler,  Klaus  (1988),  “The  Dependence  of  the  Conjunction  Fallacy  on  Subtle 
Linguistic Factors”, Psychological Research, 50, 123 – 129. 
Fox, Craig R. and Amos Tversky (1995), “Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative  
  Ignorance”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 585-603. 
Fox, Craig R. and Martin Weber (2002), “Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance  
and  Decision  Context”,  Organizational  Behavior  and  Human  Decision 
Processes, 88, 476-498. 
Heath, Chip and Amos Tversky (1991), "Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and  
Competence in Choice under Uncertainty", Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 4, 
5-28. 
Kahn, Barbara and Rakesh K. Sarin (1988), “Modelling Ambiguity in Decisions under  
  Uncertainty”, Journal of Consumer Research, 15, 265-272. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of  
  Decision under Risk”, Econometrica, 47, 263-291. 
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1982), “The Psychology of Preference”,  
  Scientific American, 246, 160-291.  
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1992), “Advances in Prospect Theory:      30 
Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 
297-324. 
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler (1991), “Anomalies: The  
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion and Status Quo Bias”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 5, 193-206. 
Keren, Gideon and Léonie E. M. Gerritsen (1999), “On the Robustness and Possible 
Accounts of Ambiguity Aversion”, Acta Psychologica, 103, 149-172.  
Koehler, Jonathan J., Brian J. Gibbs and Robin M. Hogarth (1994), “Shattering the  
Illusion  of  Control:  Multi-shot  versus  Single-shot  Gambles”,  Journal  of 
Behavioral Decision Making, 7, 183-191. 
Langer, Ellen J. (1975), “The Illusion of Control”, Journal of Personality and Social 
   Psychology, 32, 311-328. 
LeBoeuf, Robyn A. and Eldar Shafir (2003), “Deep Thoughts and Shallow Frames: 
Effortful Thinking and Susceptibility to Framing Effects”, Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 16, 77-92. 
Loewenstein, George and Samuel Issacharoff (1994), “Source Dependence in the  
  Valuation of  Objects”, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 7, 157-68. 
Mukerji, Sujoy and Jean-Marc Tallon (2001), “Ambiguity Aversion and Incompleteness 
of Financial Markets”, Review of Economic Studies, 68, 883-904.    
Raiffa, Howard (1961), “Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms: Comment.”, The 
 Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 690-694. 
Samuelson, William and Richard Zeckhauser (1988), “Status Quo Bias in Decision  
  Making”, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1, 7-59. 
Shafir, Eldar (1993), “Choosing versus Rejecting: Why some Options Are Both Better 
   and Worse than Others”, Memory and Cognition, 21, 546-556.   31 
Shafir, Eldar, Itamar Simonson and Amos Tversky (1993), “Reason-Based Choice”,  
  Cognition, 49, 1-36. 
Smith, Kip, John Dickhaut, Kevin McCabe and Jose V. Pardo (2002), “Neuronal  
Substrates for Coice under Ambiguity, Risk, Gains, and Losses”, Management 
Science, 48, 711-718. 
Thaler, Richard H. (1980), “Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice”, Journal of 
 Economic Behavior and Organization, 1, 39-60. 
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1986), “Rational Choice and the Framing of 
Decisions”, Journal of Business, 59, s251 - s278. 
Viscusi, W. Kip, Wesley A. Magat, and Joel Huber (1987), “An Investigation of the 
Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple Health Risks”. RAND Journal 
of Economics, 18, 465-479. 
Yates,  J.  Frank  and  Lisa  G.  Zukowski  (1976),  “Characterization  of  Ambiguity  in 
Decision Making”, Behavioral Science, 21, 19-25. 
   32 
 
Table 1. Number of individuals within each of the three groups deciding to play the 
unambiguous and ambiguous gamble  
 
  Unambiguous  Ambiguous  TOTAL 
Control  44  28  72 
Status quo 1  17  24  41 
Status quo 2  17  50  67 
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Table 2. The four possible profiles of within-subjects revealed preferences  
 
    ENDOWMENT CONDITION 
 
 





1- Consistently ambiguity 
seeking 
3 - Preference 
reversal consistent   
with status quo bias  NEUTRAL 
CONDITION  CHOOSE 
UNAMBIGUOUS 
 4 - Preference 
reversal inconsistent   
with status quo bias     
2- Consistently ambiguity 
averse 
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Table 3. Payoff structures for the three gambles. 
 
Pay-off structure 1  Pay-off structure 2  Pay-off structure 3 
If you draw a red ball 
you win 3000 points. 
If you draw a red ball 
you win 4000 points. 
If you draw a red ball 
you win 5000 points. 
If you draw a blue ball 
you win 3000 points. 
If you draw a blue ball 
you win 1500 points. 
If you draw a blue ball 
you win 600 points. 
If you draw a yellow 
ball you win nothing. 
If you draw a yellow 
ball you win 500 points. 
If you draw a yellow 
ball you win 400 points. 
   35 
 
Table 4. The order in which the three groups of participants completed the gambling 
schemes  
 
  GAMBLING SCHEME IN 1
ST  PHASE  GAMBLING SCHEME IN 2
ND PHASE  
GROUP 1  Neutral (N)  Participant-determined status quo (PDSQ) 
GROUP 2  Participant-determined status quo (PDSQ)  Neutral (N) 
GROUP 3  Experimenter-determined status quo (EDSQ)  Neutral (N) 
 
   36 
 
Table 5. Percentage of decisions to play the ambiguous gamble for each scheme 
 
% Ambiguous  Scheme 1  Scheme 2  Scheme 3  Total 
42  39  48  43  Neutral (Group 1) 
   n = 31  n = 31  n = 31  n = 31 
67  75  63  71 
Participant 
Determined Status 
Quo (Group 2)  n = 3   n = 20  n = 8  n = 31 
44  56  56  52 
Experimenter 
Determined Status 
Quo (Group 3)  n = 16  n = 16  n = 16  n = 16 
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Table 6. Percentage of each type of inconsistency and total percentage of inconsistent 
decisions 
 




Quo Bias  
Inconsistent 
with Status 
Quo Bias  % Inconsistent 
Group 1  73  27  36 
Group 2  78  22   29 
Group 3  87  13  17 
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Table 7.  Percentage of decisions to play the ambiguous gamble for each scheme 
 
% Ambiguous  Scheme 1  Scheme 2  Scheme 3  Total 
31  37  37  35 
Neutral (Group 1) 
   n = 35  n = 35  n = 35  n = 35 
67  58  50  59 
Participant 
Determined Status 
Quo (Group 2)  n = 6  n = 24  n = 4  n = 34 
41  47  53  47 
Experimenter 
Determined Status 
Quo (Group 3)  n = 17  n = 17  n = 17  n=17 
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Table 8. Percentage of each type of inconsistency and total percentage of inconsistent 
decisions 
 




Quo Bias  
Inconsistent 
with Status 
Quo Bias  % Inconsistent 
Group 1  91  9  31 
Group 2  75  25  35 
Group 3  78  22  18   40 




Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study. Here are some instructions. 
Please read them carefully before you proceed. 
 
·  The study consists of a set of decision sheets in which you will have to answer 
according to the particular instructions given. 
  
·  Be aware that none of the decision sheets contain the same instructions, although 
they  might  seem  similar  at  a  first  glance.  You  should  therefore,  treat  each 
decision afresh. 
 
·  You should read one sheet at a time. Every time, you must turn the page, read 
and follow the instructions. You will not be allowed to go back and change the 
choices  you  made.    Make  sure  that  you  have  read  the  instructions carefully 
before answering.  
 
·  Each person has different options from yours, so please do not discuss your 
answers with anyone else. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions. 
This study is interested in your personal preferences.  
 
·  At the end of the session each participant will receive a financial reward for 
participation (5 pounds). An additional payoff will be given to ten participants 
picked at random. The amount will depend on how many points have been won. 
Every 2000 points are worth 5 pounds. Point scoring opportunities are described 
on every decision sheet.    41 
NEUTRAL CONDITION  
(Each pair was presented and the others of the pairs randomized) 
 
GAME A:  
 
Imagine a bag filled with 30 red balls and 60 yellow and blue balls. Out of these sixty 
balls the proportions of yellow and blue balls is unknown. 
 
  30   red balls 
  ?     blue balls 
  ?     yellow balls 
         90 balls 
 
Game A is to be played with this bag as follows:  
 
If you draw a red ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a yellow ball you win xxx points. 
 
 
GAME B:  
 
Imagine a bag filled with 30 red balls, 30 yellow balls and 30 blue balls.  
 
  30   red balls 
  30   blue balls 
  30   yellow balls 
         90 balls 
 
Game B is to be played with this bag as follows: 
 
If you draw a red ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a yellow ball you win xxx points. 
 
 
You have to choose one of the two games: 
 
TO ANSWER PLEASE TICK ON THE APPROPRIATE BOX 
 
          I want to play GAME A 
 
          I want to play GAME B 
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PARTICIPANT DETERMINED STATUS QUO CONDITION  
(The three gambles were presented in randomized orders) 
 
Please imagine a bag containing 30 red balls and 60 yellow and blue balls. Out of these 
sixty balls the proportions of yellow and blue balls is unknown. 
 
   30 red balls 
     ?   blue balls 
     ?   yellow balls 




Three games to be played with this bag are described next. You have to choose one of 
the games. Attached to this sheet is a ticket that gives you the right to participate in the 
game you select.  
 
GAME 1 : 
If you draw a red ball you win points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win 3000 points. 
If you draw a yellow ball you win nothing. 
 
GAME 2: 
If you draw a red ball you win 4000 points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win 1500 points. 
If you draw a yellow ball you win 500 points. 
 
GAME 3: 
If you draw a red ball you win 5000 points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win 600 points. 
If you draw a yellow ball you win 400 points. 
 
TO ANSWER PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOX 
 
         I choose to get a ticket for GAME 1 
         I choose to get a ticket for GAME 2 
         I choose to get a ticket for GAME 3 
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(After the first decision the following instructions were given corresponding to the 
chosen gamble X) 
 
You now have in your possession a ticket to play game X. Remember, 
 
The bag corresponding to game X contains 30 red balls and 60 yellow and blue balls. 
Out of these sixty balls the proportions of yellow and blue balls is unknown. 
 
   30 red balls 
     ?   blue balls 
     ?   yellow balls 
                   90 balls 
 
Game X is to be played with this bag as follows:  
 
If you draw a red ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a yellow ball you win xxx points. 
 
 
You now have the option to either keep the ticket or change it for a ticket to play game 
Y, which is next described: 
   
Imagine a bag which is filled with 30 red balls, 30 blue balls and 30 yellow balls. 
 
      30   red balls 
     30   blue balls 
     30   yellow balls 
            90 balls 
 
Game Y is to be played with this bag as follows:  
 
If you draw a red ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a yellow ball you win xxx points. 
 
 
TO ANSWER PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOX 
 
         I want to keep the ticket to play GAME X 
 
          I want to change the ticket for a ticket to play GAME Y 
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EXPERIMENTER DETERMINED STATUS QUO CONDITION  
(Each pair was presented and the orders of the pairs randomized) 
 
 
You have a ticket that gives you the right to play game X, which is to be played as 
follows.  
 
Imagine a Bag that contains 30 red balls and 60 yellow and blue balls. Out of these sixty 
balls the proportions of yellow and blue balls is unknown. 
 
   30 red balls 
     ?   blue balls 
     ?   yellow balls 
                   90 balls 
 
Game X is to be played with this bag as follows:  
 
If you draw a red ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a yellow ball you win xxx points. 
 
 
You now have the option to either keep the ticket or change it for a ticket to play game 
Y, which is next described: 
   
Imagine a bag which is filled with 30 red balls, 30 blue balls and 30 yellow balls. 
 
      30   red balls 
     30   blue balls 
     30   yellow balls 
            90 balls 
 
Game Y is to be played with this bag as follows:  
 
If you draw a red ball you win xxx points. 
If you draw a blue ball you win xxx points. 




TO ANSWER PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOX 
 
         I want to keep the ticket to play GAME X 
 
          I want to change the ticket for a ticket to play GAME Y 
 
 
 